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WHY IT MATTERS

MARGARET L. PARIS*
Does it matter that “unresolved ambiguities” and “unacknowledged
departures from guidelines established in earlier rulings” have marked the
Supreme Court’s free-standing due process jurisprudence, as Professor Israel
carefully reveals?1 Or that the Court has failed to articulate consistently the
values that animate, or should animate, its free-standing due process decisions?
Many areas of constitutional law share these shortcomings. Are there reasons
why these judicial failures in free-standing due process cases might have
especially dangerous consequences?
There surely are reasons to be alarmed, if one believes (as I do) that the
Court functions as a “republican schoolmaster” whose opinions “call the
people to their senses” by inculcating values and clarifying the bases for legal
doctrines.2 As teacher to the citizenry, the Court’s task is especially critical
where the public is tempted to defect from the law’s underpinning values and
manifests fundamental misunderstandings about the law’s premises. Due
process suffers from both of these conditions.3
First, the public has an uneven fidelity to the “human rights” values that
underlie due process. Although due process is the primary assurance that
American criminal procedure will respect the dignity of defendants, treat

* Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. The author thanks Professor Leslie
Harris for her insights and David Pebworth for his research.
1. See generally Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process in Criminal Procedure: The
Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303 (2001). Professor
Israel uses the term “free-standing due process” to refer to the source of those rights that the
Court has recognized as flowing from the due process clause of the Fourteenth (or Fifth)
Amendment and not from an explicit procedural right mentioned in the Bill of Rights. Id. at 305.
2. The phrases in quotation marks are from Ralph Lerner’s study assessing whether it was
originally understood that the national judiciary would act as “teachers to the citizenry.” See
Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127. Lerner
acknowledges equivocal evidence about the original understanding of such a role for the “‘least
dangerous’” branch. See id. at 171 (quoting Alexander Hamilton’s THE FEDERALIST NO. 78).
But as he remarks, even those (like Hamilton) who predicted that the national judiciary would be
“‘least in a capacity to annoy or injure’” the people would impose on those officers a duty to “call
the people to their senses.” Id.
3. The reasons I will give apply to all criminal procedure guarantees, but they are especially
important to free-standing due process, as I will explain.
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defendants equally and maintain an appearance of fairness, the public’s
commitment to such due process guarantees is easily abandoned in the throes
of passion that crime arouses. If left untempered, the natural tendency to vilify
those prosecuted for crimes creates a hateful environment that breeds human
rights violations. As my colleague Leslie Harris puts it, in criminal cases
“we’re never that far from Kosovo.”
Second, the public misunderstands the basic premises for defendantoriented due process protections in criminal cases. American criminal justice
is a public process serving public goals, as opposed to a system of private
prosecutions serving private ends. The imposition of state power against
individuals requires a web of defendant-oriented procedures to prevent abuses.
As some of the rhetoric of the victims’ rights movement reveals, the public
tends to recast criminal cases as private battles between victims and offenders,
and as a result it seeks to invest victims with procedural power so as to offset
defendant-oriented procedural rights. Moreover, popular focus on private
harms and private recompense in criminal cases also obscures the social
benefits that accrue from defendant-oriented procedures. Thus, the public fails
to recognize its own stake in due process. Later in this essay, I will recount a
recent case in my home state of Oregon that illustrates both the public’s fickle
attitude toward human rights in criminal cases and its misconception of due
process’s premises.
Public Abandonment of Human Rights Values
Due process encompasses human rights values—my focus here is on the
values of dignity, equality of treatment and the appearance of fairness4—to

4. Due process scholarship has identified a complex scheme of animating values, including
dignity, equality of treatment, the appearance of fairness, participation, predictability and accurate
decision-making. Martin H. Redish and Lawrence C. Marshall have nicely summarized these
values in Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J.
455, 476-91 (1986). All of these are human rights values in the sense that they are “fundamental
rights of individuals or groups that are expressed as valid claims against [the] state.” See Gordon
A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses,
52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 4 n.5 (1983). When I use the phrase “human rights values,” though, I am
referring specifically to the first three values mentioned above—dignity, equality of treatment and
the appearance of fairness—because these form the principal protections against mistreatment
during the pendency of the criminal process.
Scholars have urged courts to inform their due process decisions with human rights laws
and concepts. See generally, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of
Children’s Rights: Incorporating Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1 (1999); Christenson, supra; see generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH
OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED & UNNAMED (1997). Although I think it is high time for
courts in due process cases to make explicit reference to human rights concepts, what I am urging
here is far more modest: frequent judicial reaffirmation of the human rights values that already
have been recognized as underlying American due process.
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whose fidelity public opinion is tenuous. If honored, these values create an
atmosphere of civility and decency toward those prosecuted for crimes. Hatred
and the desire for vengeance against offenders, however, easily overcome
public commitment to such gentle values. Here, where passions run
dangerously high, the Court must continually “call the people to their senses.”
The consequences of failing to do so can be catastrophic, because due
process values serve as “moral resources” that enable people to behave
humanely. Moral philosopher Jonathan Glover, in a chilling examination of
multiple instances of twentieth century inhumanity, points out that when moral
resources are depleted, ordinary people become capable of acts of brutality that
would otherwise be unthinkable.5 Through what he calls an “ethical
interrogation” of history, Glover uncovers several moral resources that enable
people to act humanely: first, an instinctive tendency to respond to other
people with dignity, respect and sympathy;6 second, a sense of moral identity
(in other words, a commitment to certain kinds of behavior and to an image of
who we want to be)7; and third, self-interest.8
Certain conditions, such as war or hostility against particular people or
groups, diminish these moral resources. In times of hostility, aggressors view
opponents as less than human, thus reducing both the instinctive respect felt for
opponents and the feeling of human attachment, which is a predicate of the
capacity for sympathy.9 Moreover, in times of hostility social pressures in the
aggressor group encourage people to replace their humanitarian moral
identities with angrier, crueler identities. Social pressures also change the
calculus of self-interest among the aggressors, so that people perceive their
interests as being wrapped up in the escalation of hostilities.10 Under these
conditions, people are capable of shocking levels of brutality.11
We ought to fear this phenomenon very much, because it arises in the
aftermath of crime and causes real threats to the human rights of defendants.
Following Glover’s example, it is easy to see several conditions in criminal
cases that cause the public to abandon its moral resources and its commitment
5. See generally JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 33-39 (1999).
6. Id. at 4, 22-25. Glover believes that humanitarian feelings are backed up by social
pressures but are psychological (perhaps genetic) in origin.
7. Id. at 26-27. Glover argues that our moral identity—a sense of who we are—limits our
capacity for cruelty because our “inner happiness” depends on acting in conformity with our
identity. As Glover explains, “[t]he psychological conflict generated by trampling on others will
be often (though not always) unacceptably great.” Id. at 27.
8. Id. at 18-21.
9. GLOVER, supra note 5, at 23-24.
10. Id. at 18-21.
11. Glover recounts many instances in the past century in which people engaged in
extraordinary cruelty, and he traces the conditions that reduced their moral resources. See
generally id.
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to due process.12 First, crime naturally invokes intense feelings of hatred and
vengeance that overcome the humanity with which the public might otherwise
view offenders.13 Similarly, as public commitment to war-like hostility
mounts, individuals experience social pressure to conceal or modify their
humanitarian moral identities in order to sound (and behave) “tough on crime.”
Finally, social pressure encourages people to perceive their interests as
requiring vengeful responses to crime and diminishes public willingness to
acknowledge the social benefits of due process that I discuss below.14 Perhaps
it is this set of conditions, whipped up by “war on crime” and “drug war”
rhetoric, that has enabled the American public to become complicit in a
criminal justice system that is rife with a startling level of racial, ethnic and
class injustice.15
The Supreme Court has not been sufficiently attentive to its duty to “call
the people to their senses” about these conditions. Its opinions, especially in

12. It is unclear whether commitment to human rights varies according to race, ethnicity or
class. Research consistently shows that members of minority groups and of lower socio-economic
groups are sensitive to unfairness and inequality in the criminal justice system. See, e.g.,
Catherine Kaukinen & Sandra Colavecchia, Public Perceptions of the Courts: An Examination of
Attitudes Toward the Treatment of Victims and Accused, 41 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 365, 367
(1999) (citing studies). On the other hand, some studies suggest that people with higher
education levels are less likely to demand punitive sentences. Other research suggests that
opinions about appropriate responses to crime depend more on “attitudinal variables” than
“sociodemographic variables.” See, e.g., id.
13. Scholarly literature about victim impact statements provides a rich source of information
on the emotions that are aroused by violent crime. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul
Cassell: What We Know About Victim Impact Statements, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 545 (citing social
science data that reveals jurors are more likely to approve death sentence after hearing victim
impact evidence) [hereinafter Bandes, Reply]; Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and VictimImpact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 392-410 (1996) (arguing that victim impact
statements ought to be suppressed because they “evoke emotions that do not belong” in the
context of criminal sentencing) [hereinafter Bandes, Empathy]. But see Paul G. Cassell,
Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L.
REV. 479 (arguing that victim impact statements help sentencers assess the real harm from
offenders’ conduct). See generally THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes, ed., 1999) (anthology
exploring the roles of emotion and passion in the law).
14. The benefit I principally refer to is an increase of law-abiding behavior that results when
defendants are treated in ways they perceive as fair. See infra text accompanying note 36.
15. The literature supporting this statement is well known. For a few key resources, see
generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE (1999); CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE (1993); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT (1995), and references therein. Stephen
Bright points out that the war on crime mentality has also reduced the accuracy of decisionmaking in the criminal justice system. See generally Stephen B. Bright, Casualties of the War on
Crime: Fairness, Reliability and the Credibility of Criminal Justice Systems, 51 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 413 (1997).
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recent years, fail to remind the people in clear and sweeping terms16 that
important human rights values are at stake in criminal cases. Indeed, for the
most part, the Court has been silent with respect to these values or mentions
them only perfunctorily. The Court’s very few, and now antique, opinions that
have ventured into human rights waters see little current “air time” and have
become nothing more than futile citations in defense briefs.17
The Court can reduce the dangerous war-like atmosphere that attends
criminal cases by continually reminding the public that its Constitution
embodies a moral commitment to human rights.18 Although hatred for
criminals may be instinctive, that emotion needs to be restrained by a public
morality that continually reinforces the importance of treating defendants
fairly, equally and with dignity. Such a public morality would encourage
people to aspire to act consistently with those values, as part of their moral
identities. Finally, an effective public morality would remind the people that
their self-interest depends on maintaining those values.19
Popular Misconceptions about Defendant-Oriented Procedural Rights
In addition to its uneven commitment to the human rights values that
underlie due process, the public appears to have a fundamental
misunderstanding about the premises that require defendant-oriented
procedural rights. Ours is a system of public prosecution20 directed toward

16. As Carol Steiker points out, many scholars have criticized the Court’s opinions in recent
years for their incomprehensibility. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2538-39 (1996).
17. I should know, having written many defense briefs resorting to such futile citations.
18. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 162, 173 (1952).
19. There is good reason to believe that the Court can effectively create such a public
morality. The Court has considerable legitimacy in the public’s mind. See generally BARBARA
A. PERRY, THE PRIESTLY TRIBE (1999). Moreover, social science data confirms that the Court’s
opinions do shape public attitudes. See generally WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: LAW AND ATTITUDE CHANGE (1967); STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1972). This is especially true where the public has the benefit
of skilled “translators” to help it understand Court pronouncements and where interest groups
have a stake in the outcome of cases. See MUIR, supra, at 111-21. In recent years, prosecutors
have become the most powerful translators of Supreme Court opinions in criminal procedure
cases and victims’ rights groups the most active stakeholders. If the Court were to make a greater
effort to illuminate the history and values that underlie defendant-oriented criminal procedures, a
wider range of translators (including, perhaps, defense lawyer groups and civil rights experts)
would have incentives to explain the Court’s decisions to the public. In addition, more people
might view themselves to be stakeholders in our system of procedural rights.
20. In Anglo-American criminal justice systems, the state “steals the conflict” from victim
and offender. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, Some Doubts About Restorative Justice, 4 CRIM. L.F.
277 (1993) (using phrase from Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1,
4 (1977)); Sue Anna Moss Cellini, The Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States: Opening the Door of the Criminal Justice System to the Victim, 14 ARIZ. J.
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public goals.21 Victims are not parties in criminal cases, and private
prosecutions seeking vengeance, compensation or other private ends, are rarely
permitted or pursued.22 Because of the public character of American criminal
justice, the constitutional guarantees that protect individuals against state
power extend to those suspected, accused or convicted of crimes, and not to
victims or the state representing victims’ interests.23
This orientation results in procedures that appear one-sided at first. For
example, there is no point in a criminal prosecution at which one can avoid
asking, “Does this procedure affect the defendant’s rights?” On the other
hand, there are many points at which the victim’s interests remain
unacknowledged or subordinate to the defendant’s rights. Every defendant
enjoys a constitutionally protected right to be present in the courtroom, to
protect his right to confront witnesses24 and, when witnesses are not present, to
preserve the “fulness [sic] of his opportunity to defend against the charge.”25
Thus, the defendant may not be excluded from the courtroom even if the court
fears that his testimony would be affected by hearing the testimony of other
witnesses. On the other hand, crime victims constitutionally can be excluded
INT’L & COMP. L. 839, 842-48 (1997) (describing history of public prosecution in the United
States).
21. Among these is the orderly enforcement of laws through decisions that punish, reform,
or incapacitate lawbreakers, deter others from lawbreaking, and express societal disapproval of
lawbreaking. The maintenance of individual rights against state power also is a prominent public
goal of American criminal justice. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously:
The State’s Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1045-50 (1987).
22. Victim participation is reduced in our system, although victims may have rights to
restitution and to sue civilly, and under some circumstances, to engage in a private prosecution.
See, e.g., Cellini, supra note 20, at 867-68 (referencing survival of private prosecution statutes in
some states); John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private
Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 552-97 (1994) (arguing that private prosecutors violate due
process). Victim participation in criminal cases appears more pervasive in other legal systems,
but those systems feature significant structural differences. See William T. Pizzi & Walter
Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on American
Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37, 45 (1996); Matti Joutsen, Listening to the Victim: The
Victim’s Role in European Criminal Justice Systems, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 95, 96-102 (1987);
Daniel W. Van Ness, New Wine and Old Wineskins: Four Challenges of Restorative Justice, 4
CRIM. L. F. 251, 259 (1993) (suggesting reconceptualization of Anglo-American criminal justice
to feature a collaborative effort between victims, offenders and government).
23. The prosecution sometimes enjoys reciprocal procedural benefits, but these are not rights
in the same sense. See Bandes, supra note 21, at 1022-24. Of course, as Professor Israel points
out, the Court frequently decides due process claims by examining the interests of society and the
prosecution. See Israel, supra note 1, at 420-24.
24. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (“We have never doubted . . . that the
Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing
before the trier of fact.”).
25. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934); United States v. Gagnon, 470
U.S. 522 (1985); Israel, supra note 1, at 372, 391 n.502.
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from trial proceedings. Even where statutes or state provisions provide a right
to victims to be present, 26 they may nevertheless be excluded if the trial court
believes their testimony would be affected by the testimony of others.27
This lack of parity between defendant and victim runs counter to popular
expectations.28 It has been a central tenet of the victim’s rights movement,
whose advocates (including many prosecutors) envision criminal cases as
battles between offenders and victims29 and who argue that because defendants
have procedural rights, victims should have them too.30 For example, a task
force appointed in 1982 by President Reagan characterized the criminal justice
system as a set of scales “out of balance,” evoking the image of defendants’
rights on one side of the scale and victims’ rights on the other.31 This theme
has been taken up in state constitutions and statutes. My own state recently
amended its constitution to add a “Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights,” the stated
purposes of which are:
To preserve and protect the right of crime victims to justice, to ensure crime
victims a meaningful role in the criminal and juvenile justice systems, to

26. States have enacted constitutional and statutory provisions granting procedural rights to
crime victims. See Robert P. Mosteller & H. Jefferson Powell, With Disdain for the
Constitutional Craft: The Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment, 78 N.C. L. REV. 371, 374
(2000). Those rights are enforceable only to the extent they do not conflict with federal
constitutional guarantees, although as Mosteller and Powell point out, few victims’ rights run
afoul of federal guarantees. See id. Victims also enjoy rights granted by federal statute. Again
those rights are limited by constitutional guarantees and, if the statute so provides, by other
concerns, such as the need for accurate fact finding. See id. at 375; see also United States v.
McVeigh,106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing the Victim’s Rights and Restitution Act of 1990,
42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(4) (1994)).
27. See McVeigh, 106 F.3d at 325 (affirming, in Oklahoma City bombing case, trial court’s
exclusion from trial proceedings of victims who would be presenting impact evidence at
sentencing). In the federal system, crime victims have a statutory right “to be present at all public
court proceedings related to the offense.” See id. at 334 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(4)). That
right is limited by the trial court’s power to exclude victims if it determines “that testimony by the
victim would be materially affected if the victim heard other testimony at trial.” Id. at 335.
According to the Tenth Circuit in McVeigh, the limitation subordinates the victim’s right to the
policies expressed in Federal Rule of Evidence 615, which provides: “At the request of a party the
court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.”
Id.
28. Apparently it runs counter to the expectations of some judges as well. See, e.g., Joshua
D. Greenberg, Is Payne Defensible?: The Constitutionality of Admitting Victim-Impact Evidence
at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 75 IND. L.J. 1349, 1379-80 (2000) (describing a “balancing”
justification that some courts have used in order to craft victim participation that offsets the
“privileged” position that the criminal justice system affords defendants).
29. See Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 101.
30. See Lynne Henderson, Co-Opting Compassion: The Federal Victim’s Rights
Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 582-83 (1998).
31. See Cellini, supra note 20, at 853-54 (citing PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF
CRIMES, FINAL REPORT vi (Dec. 1982)).
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accord crime victims due dignity and respect and to ensure that criminal and
juvenile court delinquency proceedings are conducted to seek the truth as to
the defendant’s innocence or guilt, and also to ensure that a fair balance is
struck between the rights of crime victims and the rights of criminal defendants
in the course and conduct of criminal and juvenile court delinquency
proceedings.32

Even leaving the victims’ rights movement aside, it is not hard to
understand why the public would expect parity between defendants and
victims: within American culture many people believe that every question has
two sides, and that a fair resolution of any question requires giving the two
opponents an equal opportunity to battle it out.33 There is no reason to think
that the public is aware that the structure of criminal procedure diverges from
this victim-offender battle model.34 Without constantly reminding the public
why due process has a defendant orientation, we can hardly expect the public
to abandon its commitment to a notion of parity between victims and
defendants.35

32. OR. CONST. art. I, § 42, cl. 1 (1999) (emphasis added).
33. See generally DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: STOPPING AMERICA’S
WAR OF WORDS (1999). Tannen, who writes about contemporary American culture, argues that
Americans are wedded to a battle model of communication, which posits differences as polarities
that are to be resolved by confrontation. The loudest and most skilled advocates emerge the
victors in these confrontations, and there is little attention paid to understanding other points of
view, perceiving shared interests and values, and developing consensus.
34. The victims’ rights movement encourages the public to view the criminal process as a
battle between offenders and victims. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 29, at 101. Social science data
suggests that the public is susceptible to such an invitation, because it lacks knowledge about
many aspects of criminal justice in the United States. See Deborah W. Denno, The Perils of
Public Opinion, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 741, 753-55 (2000) (citing research documenting public
ignorance about “matters significant to criminal justice policy,” including the nature and extent of
crime, recidivism rates, laws, legal rights and sentencing policies). Tom Tyler and John Darley
confirm popular misconceptions about law and legal procedure and the need for “public
education.” See Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public
Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating
Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 728-29 (2000) (citing studies).
35. When I urge the Court to “call the people to their senses” about due process values that
are inconsistent with some of the goals of the victims’ rights movement, I do not mean to suggest
that victims should have no role in the criminal process. But victims’ roles must be carefully
crafted to avoid diminishing public commitment to human rights values. Moreover, prosecutors
must be careful not to become victims’ advocates. See Walker A. Matthews, Note, Proposed
Victims’ Rights Amendment: Ethical Considerations for the Prudent Prosecutor, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 735, 743 (1998). Others have written extensively on the appropriate role of
victims in the criminal process, especially after the United States Supreme Court decided Payne
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), which permits victim impact statements in capital sentencing
proceedings. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 28, at 1381-82 (disagreeing with Payne on
constitutional grounds); Bandes, Reply, supra note 13; Bandes, Empathy, supra note 13; Vivian
Berger, Payne and Suffering—A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST.
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The public needs to be educated also about the societal benefits that accrue
from adherence to defendant-oriented procedures. Among these is the
likelihood that defendants will be more law-abiding in the future if they
believe they have been treated fairly during the criminal process. Tom Tyler
and John Darley have recently described several findings that support this
statement.36 Studies demonstrate that law-abidingness requires “supportive
public values.”37 Chief among these is a belief in the legitimacy of legal
authority, and legitimacy depends on a perception that legal authorities use fair
procedures to make decisions.38 Studies suggest that even lawbreakers tend to
be more law-abiding in the future if they believe they have been treated
fairly.39 The lesson is that society as a whole benefits in terms of lawabidingness (and presumably lower recidivism rates) from procedures that are
oriented around fairness to the defendant—procedures that, among other
things, respect the defendant’s dignity, ensure equal treatment and maintain the
appearance of fairness.
When prosecutors, victims and politicians demand severe punishments,
they encourage the public to overlook the social benefits of due process,40 and
as a result the Court needs to step in and “call the people to their senses.”
Although the Court on rare occasions has made reference to rehabilitative
aspects of due process,41 it must articulate the link between due process and
U. L. REV. 21 (1992) (arguing that permitting victims to present impact evidence “actually
amounts to a step backward for their cause”). But see Cassell, supra note 13. See also generally
Robert P. Mosteller, Victims’ Rights and the United States Constitution: An Effort to Recast the
Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1694 (1997) (arguing that the victims’ rights
movement is an effort to reduce or deny defendants’ rights).
36. See generally Tyler & Darley, supra note 34, at 722-39 (describing “psychological
jurisprudence” research).
37. Id. at 738-39.
38. Id. at 722-24. See also, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law
Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 400-01 (2000).
39. Id. at 724.
40. Victims, because they are “prone to vindictive attitudes,” rarely pay attention to
reformative goals and overwhelmingly complain that defendants are treated too leniently. See
Donald J. Hall, Victims’ Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
233, 244 (1991). They may even exaggerate the harms done in order to convince courts to mete
out severe penalties. See Robert C. Black, Forgotten Penological Purposes: A Critique of Victim
Participation in Sentencing, 1994 AM. J. JURIS. 225, 230-32. Other studies have found that in
some contexts (for example, settlement conferences in which victims are allowed to participate),
victims do not necessarily demand the maximum authorized penalty. See Hall, supra, at 244-45.
41. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 167 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging
broad admissibility of non-coerced confessions: “Not only for society, but for the wrongdoer
himself, admission of guilt, if not coerced, is inherently desirable because it advances the goals of
both justice and rehabilitation”); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (involving due
process rights owed parolee) (“[S]ociety has a further interest in treating the parolee with basic
fairness: fair treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding
reactions to arbitrariness.”).
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law abidingness much more clearly and consistently if it is to counteract the
punitive messages of powerful interest groups. In other words, the Court
should remind the public that its own self-interest is enhanced when due
process is honored, so that the public will consider itself a stakeholder in our
system of defendant-oriented procedural rights.
What I have said above argues for a renewed attention to the Court’s
teaching role throughout criminal procedure cases. But that role probably is
especially important in free-standing due process cases, which tend to involve
defendant-oriented rights about which the public knows very little. A large
fraction of the public probably is aware of some of the rights embodied in
explicit Bill of Rights guarantees, such as the search and seizure provisions and
the right against self-incrimination. Undoubtedly much less is known
popularly about some of the rights embodied within free-standing due
process.42 Not only are search and seizure and confession provisions more
obviously part of our public conversation (they feature prominently in
television and movie portrayals of police-citizen encounters), but also the
prototypic behaviors they regulate—government snooping, police brutality and
so on—fall into instantly recognizable patterns. Psychological research
suggests that people make judgments by analogizing to familiar patterns, and
legal rules that fit familiar patterns are more likely to be understood
accurately.43 Some of the free-standing due process guarantees are less readily
analogized to familiar patterns. The right of represented defendants to be
present during trial, for example, lacks an immediately relevant analog.
Because the public may have a lower level of understanding about the defense
orientation of procedural protections that spring from free-standing due
process, it is especially important that the Court’s opinions in those cases fulfill
the “republican schoolmaster” role.

42. Carol Steiker uses Meir Dan-Cohen’s distinction between “conduct rules” and “decision
rules” to suggest that the public is much more aware of the Supreme Court’s “conduct rules” for
police than its “decision rules,” which regulate what happens at trial. See Steiker, supra note 16,
at 2532-40 (referencing Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630-32 (1984)).
43. See Dan M. Kahan, Lay Perceptions of Justice vs. Criminal Law Doctrine: False
Dichotomy?, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 793 (2000) (summarizing theory of pattern recognition and
current research). The public also appears to have a very detailed set of expectations about some
sorts of police conduct and government snooping. See generally Christopher Slobogin & Joseph
E. Schumacher, Rating the Intrusiveness of Law Enforcement Searches and Seizures, 17 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 183 (1993).
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Lessons from the Kip Kinkel Sentencing
A recent Oregon case exemplifies what happens when the public’s
commitment to human rights values is overcome by hatred and when the
public’s misunderstanding about the appropriate role of victims is left
uncorrected. The case promised from the beginning to have a tragic outcome.
It featured a large group of victims who engaged in an extreme form of “victim
allocution.”44 The victims were pitted against (to use a battle image) a
defendant who was both unusually sympathetic (by virtue of his youth and
undisputedly serious mental illness) and unusually dangerous. Refereeing the
battle was a trial judge who applied Oregon law carefully but declined to
employ the larger notion of due process to “call the people to their senses.”
Though you may be familiar with the facts of this case broadly, a more detailed
examination follows.
On May 21, 1998, fifteen-year-old Kip Kinkel opened fire on students in
his Springfield, Oregon high school cafeteria.45 Kinkel was small and slight,
and fellow students quickly wrestled him to the floor, disarmed him and beat
and kicked him.46 Before that happened, however, he had killed two students
and wounded twenty-five others.47 After his arrest Kinkel was suicidal and
distraught.48 He charged at a detective brandishing a knife he pulled out of his
sock.49 Officers subdued and interrogated Kinkel without giving him an

44. I have borrowed the word “allocution” from its common law context, in which it referred
to the convicted defendant’s opportunity to speak before sentencing. See Black, supra note 40.
More broadly, to allocute means to speak, to address, even to exhort. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 236 (2d ed. 1961), available at http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00006068. The
victims in my Oregon case did all that, and more. They were permitted to express hatred toward
the defendant, threaten him with physical harm, and inflict on him what can only be called
psychic damage. The victims also were permitted to give their opinions about the appropriate
sentence. Not surprisingly, they demanded that the sentencing judge mete out the harshest
possible sentence.
45. Information about the shooting, and the aftermath, can be found on the Web site of the
REGISTER-GUARD, the local newspaper for the Eugene-Springfield, Oregon area. See
Information Related To the May 21, 1998, Thurston High School Shootings in Springfield, Ore.,
THE REGISTER-GUARD, available at http://www.registerguard.com/standingdocs/shoot_items.
html.
46. See Eric Mortenson, Tragedy Hits Home: Shootings In Springfield, THE REGISTERGUARD, May 22, 1998, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19980522/1a.shooting.
0522.html.
47. As students held him down he reportedly said, “Just shoot me. Shoot me now.” See Joe
Kidd, Teen-agers’ Bravery Earns Praise Amid the Anguish, THE REGISTER-GUARD, May 23,
1998, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19980523/1a.rykerhero.0523.html.
48. See Bill Bishop, Kinkel’s Pretrial Hearing Wraps Up, THE REGISTER-GUARD, March 6,
1999, available at http://www.registerguard.com/ news/19990306/1a.kinkel.0306.html.
49. See Janelle Hartman, Boy Charged as Adult on 4 Counts of Murder, THE REGISTERGUARD, May 23, 1998, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19980523/1a.mainstory.
0523.html.
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opportunity to consult with counsel, although a defense attorney had rushed to
the jail where he was being held.50 Police feared that Kinkel had planted
bombs in his home, and upon searching the home they discovered the bodies of
Kinkel’s mother and father, whom he apparently had killed the previously
evening.51 By nightfall, local and national news media were giving the story
extensive coverage. Kinkel was placed under suicide watch at the county
juvenile detention center. Personnel reported that he appeared grief-stricken
and the suicide watch continued throughout his detention.52
The Lane County District Attorney’s office charged Kinkel with twentysix counts of attempted murder and four counts of aggravated murder, a capital
offense under Oregon law, though Kinkel’s youth made him ineligible for the
death penalty.53 It was clear from the outset of the case that Kinkel’s lawyers
would most likely mount an insanity defense, and although the prosecution
planned to contest his legal insanity it never disputed the fact that he was
seriously mentally ill. There was much evidence that Kinkel had been
mentally ill for years, and that his family (and a treating psychologist) had
gravely underestimated the seriousness of his illness.54 For example, virtually
from birth Kinkel had stuck out like a sore thumb in his talented family.55 His
parents had difficulty controlling him but only sporadically sought professional

50. See Bishop, supra note 48. The trial judge later upheld Kinkel’s Miranda waiver of
counsel, accepting the prosecution’s argument that Kinkel was not rendered incompetent to waive
his rights either by virtue of his youth or his mental condition, and that he had waived his rights
knowingly and intelligently. See Bill Bishop, Kinkel’s Statements Admissible, Judge Rules, THE
REGISTER-GUARD, June 9, 1999, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19990609/1a.
kinkelevidence.0609.html.
51. See Hartman, supra note 49.
52. See Eric Mortenson, Kinkel’s Conduct Troubled Jailers, THE REGISTER-GUARD, Nov. 2,
1999,
available
at
http://www.registerguard.com/news/19991102/1a.kinkel.1102.html.
According to a PBS Frontline documentary about the case, Kinkel became “increasingly upset as
he describes [to police] killing his father and putting a sheet over his body, wailing and crying
and hyperventilating. Through his tears he says, ‘I told her I loved her,’ before he killed his
mother. Then he screams, ‘God damn the voices in my head!’” Frontline: The Killer at Thurston
High (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 18, 2000), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/kinkel/trial/ [hereinafter Frontline]. The Frontline documentary highlights
Kinkel’s “descent into darkness and murder.” See Diane Dietz, Kinkel Documentary Fleshes Out
Tragedy, THE REGISTER-GUARD, January 12, 2000, available at http://www.registerguard.com/
news/20000112/1d.cr.frontline.0112.html.
53. Links to court documents can be found on the Lane County Web site, at
http://www.co.lane.or.us/trial/.
54. Aside from failing to get adequate help for Kinkel’s illness, his parents also purchased
him at least one gun. See Joe Mosley, Kinkels: Neighbors and Friends Paint a Picture of a Levelheaded Family Whose Son Had a Fascination with Guns, THE REGISTER-GUARD, May 22, 1998,
available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19980522/1a.kinkels.0522.html.
55. See, e.g., id.
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treatment for him.56 Dr. Jeffrey Hicks, a psychologist who had treated Kinkel
over a six-month period, testified that Kinkel was “angry and depressed,”57 but
psychologists hired by the defense believed that he had suffered from auditory
hallucinations for years, that he was psychotic and that he possibly suffered
from schizophrenia or paranoid schizophrenia.58 A pediatric neurologist
performed brain scans and found that Kinkel had brain lesions that would have

56. See Frontline, supra note 52, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/kinkel/trial/#4. Dr. Jeffrey Hicks, who had been Kinkel’s treating psychologist for six
months, testified regarding Faith Kinkel’s concern about “anti-social acting out.”
57. Hicks testified that he met with Kinkel and his mother nine times. During these visits,
Kinkel did not mention voices or hallucinations, but Hicks found him “angry and depressed” and
recommended that his physician prescribe medication. Id. Apparently Kinkel improved after
taking Prozac, but his parents discontinued the medication after a short while. Id.
58. See id. For example, Dr. Orin Bolstad, a child psychologist who examined Kinkel for
more than thirty-two hours and performed a battery of tests, testified that Kinkel’s auditory
hallucinations had begun in sixth grade. Id. As Frontline recounts Bolstad’s testimony,
Kip told him that he remembered the first time he heard a voice; it said, “You are a stupid
piece of shit. You aren’t worth anything.” They scared and upset him, he said, and he
tried various things to quiet them: biking, watching TV, punching his head. According to
Bolstad, Kip said that he never told anyone about the voices because he was embarrassed.
He didn’t want anyone, especially girls, to think he was crazy. Bolstad also related his
discussion with Kip about an incident in 1998 when he had disrupted English class by
shouting, “God damn this voice inside my head!” This is the only time before the
shootings that any mention of voices was recorded. Bolstad believed that Kip murdered
his parents and opened fired on fellow students the next day . . . under the influence of
these hallucinatory voices. He described Kip recounting the voices to him: “‘My Dad was
sitting at the bar [in the kitchen]. The voices said, ‘Shoot him.’ I had no choice. The
voices said I had no choice.’ and later, after he killed his mother, ‘The voices said, ‘Go to
school and kill everybody. Look what you’ve already done.’” During cross-examination,
Bolstad stated categorically, “I think the primary thing that was operating in his feeling
and need to kill . . . were the voices.”
Frontline, supra note 52. Dr. William Sack, another child psychiatrist who interviewed Kinkel,
concluded that Kinkel was “a very very sick psychotic individual.” Id. Sack also said that as
Kinkel grew older he might “eventually might fall into the schizoaffective category or into
paranoid schizophrenia.” Id. Sack concurred with Bolstad that auditory hallucinations were the
immediate cause of the shootings: “I feel his crimes and his behavior over those two days are the
direct result of a psychotic product that was building over three years that suddenly emerged,
taking over his ego.” Id. When asked whether Kinkel could have been lying to the psychologists
in order to convince them of a mental illness, Dr. Sack said he had employed a “validity analysis”
that consisted of “a formal evaluation of the content and consistency of Kip’s statements, his
affect during the interviews and the results of various tests designed to figure out if he was telling
the truth.” Id. Pursuant to this analysis, Sack concluded that Kinkel “was so consistent in the
details of his stories and emotional reactions that he was as sure as he could be that Kip was not
faking.” Frontline, supra note 52. Dr. Sack concluded, “If he were lying to me, he would be the
best actor I’ve ever seen.” Id.
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impeded his impulse control.59 Kinkel himself was terrified by his illness and
agonized over his problems and their impact on his family.60
The trial was expected to be a showdown between the defense experts and
a well-known prosecution insanity expert nicknamed “Dr. Death” by the
defense bar for his role in defeating insanity claims throughout the country.61
Publicity was extraordinary, and public sentiment against the defendant ran
high, as might be expected. The trial judge refused to move the trial’s venue to
another location.62 On the eve of trial, the prosecution and Kinkel’s lawyers
agreed to a plea agreement under which Kinkel would admit his sanity and his
intent to kill and plead guilty to four murder and twenty-six attempted murder
counts.63 The benefit to Kinkel from the deal was that it removed the
possibility of a jury convicting him of aggravated murder, which in Oregon
carries a potential life without parole sentence. As part of the deal the parties
also agreed that the sentences on the murder counts should run concurrently.64

59. See id. (testimony of Dr. Richard J. Konkol). At the sentencing hearing, Dr. Konkol
displayed a computer scan of Kinkel’s brain. Dr. Konkol testified that these revealed lesions, or
holes, in the frontal lobe. According to Konkol:
These images revealed reduced blood flow to the frontal lobe, the area associated
with emotional control and decisionmaking. He testified that this reduced brain activity
was consistent with new research on children who become schizophrenic, and that he
thought it could make Kip more susceptible to a psychotic episode.
Id.
60. In a note found in his home after the killings, for example, Kinkel wrote:
I have just killed my parents! I don’t know what is happening. I love my mom and
dad so much. I just got two felonies on my record. My parents can’t take that! It would
destroy them. The embarrassment would be too much for them. They couldn’t live with
themselves. I’m so sorry. I am a horrible son. I wish I had been aborted. I destroy
everything I touch. I can’t eat. I can’t sleep. I didn’t deserve them. They were
wonderful people. It’s not their fault or the fault of any person, organization, or television
show. My head just doesn’t work right. God damn these VOICES inside my head. I
want to die. I want to be gone. But I have to kill people. I don’t know why. I am so
sorry! Why did God do this to me. I have never been happy. I wish I was happy. I wish
I made my mother proud. I am nothing! I tried so hard to find happiness. But you know
me I hate everything. I have no other choice. What have I become? I am so sorry.
Frontline, supra note 52, available at http://pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kinkel/kip/
writings.html.
61. See Paul Neville, Expert Put Kinkel on Defensive, THE REGISTER-GUARD, Sept. 26,
1999, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19990926/1a.dietz.0926.html.
62. See Bill Bishop & Eric Mortenson, Kinkel Trial Delayed, THE REGISTER-GUARD, Feb.
18, 1999, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19990218/1a.kinkel.0218.html; see
also Bill Bishop, Kinkel’s Attorneys Want Trial Relocated, THE REGISTER-GUARD, Dec. 16,
1998, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19981216/1a.kinkel.1216.html.
63. See Defendant’s Plea Petition, Oregon v. Kinkel, No. 20-98-09574, slip op. (Lane
County Ct. 1999), available at http://www.co.lane.or.us/trial/pleatext.htm.
64. Frontline, supra note 52. Under Oregon law, the maximum sentence on the murder
convictions was twenty-five years in prison. See http://www.co.lane.or.us/trial/pleatext.htm.
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There was no agreement, however, about whether the attempted murder
sentences should run concurrently,65 and the parties proceeded to a sentencing
hearing.
The stakes at the hearing were high, because the judge had to decide
whether to sentence Kinkel to an effective life without parole sentence (if he
were to order consecutive sentences on the attempted murder counts Kinkel
would face up to 220 years in prison)66 or a concurrent term of years (a
minimum of twenty-five) that would give Kinkel the possibility of freedom
much later in his life. The prosecution urged consecutive sentences. The
defense put on the expert witnesses discussed above in an effort both to
mitigate Kinkel’s acts and to convince the court that he could safely be
released in the future, with appropriate treatment and medication.67
The judge devoted a full day of the sentencing hearing to hearing from
more than fifty victims and members of victims’ families.68 Statements of
these victims served as a counterweight to the defense plea for the possibility
of freedom in the future.69 The words of these victims were powerful. Many
of the victims expressed hatred and anger, speaking directly to the defendant.70
Several told Kinkel that he deserved to die and threatened violence. One
wounded student spoke to Kinkel thus during his statement:
I think prison, a lifetime in prison is too good for you. If a dog was to go
insane and if a dog got rabid and it bit someone, you destroy it. So I stand here
and I ask, why haven’t you been destroyed? . . . You don’t deserve to live. You
don’t deserve to breathe. . . . I can’t stand here and look at you without wanting
to kill you.71

65. These carried minimum sentences of ninety months each, and under Oregon law the
judge could order the sentences to be served consecutively. See Defendant’s Plea Petition,
Oregon v. Kinkel, No. 20-98-09574, slip op. (Lane County Ct. 1999), available at
http://www.co.lane.or.us/trial/pleatext.htm.
66. Oregon, like many states, has abolished its parole system. Kinkel would be required to
complete the term of years ordered, minus statutory “good time.” See id. Oregon retains the
possibility of executive clemency. See Judge’s Statement, Oregon v. Kinkel, No. 20-98-09574,
slip op. (Lane County Ct. 1999), available at http://www.co.lane.or.us/trial/
judge’s_statement.htm.
67. Dr. Konkol, the defense neurologist, testified that Kinkel “might improve under proper
medication and treatment.” See Frontline, supra note 52.
68. See Bill Bishop, Victims Have Their Say: Sentence Expected Today, THE REGISTERGUARD, Nov. 10, 1999, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19991110/
1a.kinkel.1110.html.
69. See, e.g., Oregon v. Kinkel, No. 20-98-09574, slip op. (Lane County Ct. 1999). A
complete transcript of the victims’ statements [hereinafter Victim Impact Statements] is on file
with the Saint Louis University Law Journal. Some of the statements are available on the web, as
indicated.
70. See Neville, supra note 61.
71. For the complete statement of Jakob Ryker, see Frontline, supra note 52, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kinkel/trial/victims.html. The media widely
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Another victim, the mother of a wounded student, said this to Kinkel:
Death wouldn’t have been the answer for you, or for us. To get any kind of
justice, for you to be tortured and troubled as we are is, to me, the final justice.
Knowing the kind of person that you are, it’s not going to be long, when you
get put into prison, that you’re going to become someone’s little friend. And
everyone knows that.72

A father stated, “Kip, I’m a pacifist. I have endured many things without
taking a blow back. But if the court allowed me, I would kick the shit out of
you.”73 There were victims who did not express anger or hatred. One student
said, “I don’t hate you. I have no hate inside of me for you. In fact, I care
about you.”74 Such sentiments, however, were few. Neither the defense nor
the prosecution objected during the victim statements, and the trial judge
stemmed the tide of these expressions only once.
In addition to their expressions of feelings to the defendant, the victims
appeared to believe they should share their own sentencing preferences. Said a
parent, “We’re here in a court of law today to tell you what we think is a fair
sentence for those crimes.”75 Forty of the fifty-two victim statements
expressed an opinion about the appropriate sentence, and thirty-eight of those
called specifically for life in prison. Only Kristen Kinkel, the defendant’s
sister and daughter of the slain parents, urged the judge to give Kinkel a chance
of freedom in the future.76 Some victims commented on the consecutive
portrayed Ryker as a hero, because he had helped disarm Kinkel. See, e.g., Mortenson, supra note
46.
72. Statements by Kip Kinkel’s Victims and Their Survivors, THE REGISTER-GUARD,
available at http://www.registerguard.com/standingdocs/shoot_victims.html.
73. Id.
74. Victim Impact Statements, supra note 69, at 21.
75. Id. at 44.
76. Frontline, supra note 52, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kinkel/trial/
letter.html. Kristen Kinkel read this letter to the trial judge:
Dear Judge Mattison. I am shaken by how difficult this letter is for me to write. I was
told that you may need it to better understand my little brother. I wish there was an ideal
place to begin. But where does one start when a loved one’s life is laid across someone
else’s table?
What keeps me believing in him and loving him is the fact that he is a good person
that came from a good home. I feel silly writing that, because it seems so contradictory,
looking at what actually took place. However, it’s the truth, and it keeps me alive. I wish
more than anything that you, the man who decides his fate, could know him like I do. So
a little bit of the Kip Kinkel that I know is where I will begin.
Growing up with him was very average. I was the typical big sister, and he seemed
like every other little brother I had ever had any contact with. Only with hindsight do I
truly see the signs of someone who was in desperate need of help, different help than any
of us knew how to give.
Kip was a very compassionate person. Like my mother, the norm for him was to put
others first. He absolutely loved animals and treated them better than most. He was a
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people pleaser. He found ways to learn what those around him wanted and made every
effort to become it. I believe that is how he dealt with his illness so well and with such
subtlety for so long.
He was genuinely concerned about the same issues kids his age are, and unusually
devoted to those that meant something extra special to him. When asked about his
interests and opinions, he was able to rationally explain his ideas about them in ways far
beyond those which someone his age would be capable of. He was very likeable and had
a great sense of humor. He loved to make people laugh and did it well. My mother and I
used to say that he would be a wonderful boyfriend because of his sensitivity and his
devotion to what he loved. Kip had a lot of potential, and to see that die absolutely
crushes me.
That is who I remember Kip to be, and let me tell you about who he is today. He’s
extremely bright, and the potential I mentioned before is still there, buried inside. He is
hurting more than any of us can imagine, and yet is adapting to an extremely unpleasant
situation better than most ever could. He is polite and considerate to those that have
contact with him. He is realistic about his situation, yet remains hopeful that he will find
something positive in it.
He does have plans for the future and has discussed with me his ideas of becoming a
productive member of society, even from behind bars. All of his hopes and dreams have
to do with getting an education and using it to help people without one. He already has
passed the GED with very high scores.
I believe what he needs is the hope that he has a chance of achieving these goals.
My first visit with him after this happened was at Skipworth and consisted of only crying.
It took weeks for him to make eye contact with me, and even longer to say something.
When he finally did, it was, ‘I am so sorry.’
I believe he is aware of the pain that he has caused, and is just as shocked as the rest
of us that he was capable of such horror. We were talking last week about the upcoming
hearings and preparing ourselves for the things that we would have to listen to. I told him
to do what I do, and just tune out that which you don’t want to hear. I told him to go to a
safe place in his memory, and not listen to the victims when they talk, because they are
angry and going to say things they really don’t mean. He stopped me and said, ‘No, I owe
it to them to listen.’
I share this story because I think it emphasizes the kind of person Kip was and still
is. I think it also shows that there really should be no concern for this kind of thing to
happen again.
I love my brother more than I ever thought possible. And not because he needs me
to, but because I need to. It is a difficult concept for an outsider to understand, but it
comes from what is inside us.
He will need support, love, medical help, et cetera. But most of all right now, he
needs hope. In twenty-five years, we will be well into the Twenty-first Century. Our
society will be very different. The technology and knowledge we will have then is mind
boggling. The advances we will have made in psychological research and medication will
amaze us. Kip will be forty.
Thank you for your time in reading this. I wanted to speak from my heart and hope
you will forgive the informality of this letter. I realize you have a huge amount of things
to consider in this case, and I hope I haven’t sounded like a nagging sister. Thanks again
for your attention.
Id.
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Michael Crowley, father of student Ryan Crowley, on that issue:
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Here is

Your Honor, don’t tell Kip that it didn’t matter when he pointed the gun at
Ryan’s head and pulled the trigger. Don’t tell Ryan it was no big deal, it
doesn’t matter, “you don’t matter.” . . . If you don’t run the sentence
consecutively, it is the same effect as saying it didn’t happen, there is no
penalty. Do not treat it as if nothing happened. Do not send the message to
my son and the other children that their suffering has no consequences to
Kip . . . .77

A parent of a wounded student said, “Anything less [than life in prison]
would be a slap in the face on the victims and the families of children you have
murdered.”78 Another parent warned the judge:
All of the victims, as I’ve heard today, stand united in wanting Kip Kinkel put
in prison for the rest of his life. If it doesn’t happen, and Kip has the potential
to be released back into society, then another crisis is going to occur, for every
family affected by this crime, and many others that reacted to it. So this is
what you can do, now, to affect our future. That’s what you can do to help my
family.79

The sentencing judge clearly felt the impact of these statements. After
hearing from the victims, and from Kinkel,80 the judge ordered a sentence of
111 years, making it certain that Kinkel would die in prison.81 The judge noted
in his sentencing order that his decision had been affected by the victims’
sentiments: “It became very apparent yesterday that this sentence needed to
account for each of the wounded, who rightly call themselves survivors, and

77. Frontline, supra note 52, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
kinkel/trial/victims.html.
78. Victim Impact Statements, supra note 69, at 41.
79. Id. at 69.
80. See Frontline, supra note 54. Kinkel read this statement:
I have spent days trying to figure out what I want to say. I have crumpled up dozens
of pieces of paper and disregarded even more ideas. I have thought about what I could
say that might make people feel just a little bit better. But I have come to the realization
that it really doesn’t matter what I say. Because there is nothing I can do to take away any
of the pain and destruction I have caused. I absolutely loved my parents and had no
reason to kill them. I had no reason to dislike, kill or try to kill anyone at Thurston. I am
truly sorry that this has happened. I have gone back in my mind hundreds of times and
changed one detail, one small event so this never would have happened. I wish I could. I
take full responsibility for my actions. These events have pulled me down into a state of
deterioration and self-loathing that I didn’t know existed. I am very sorry for everything I
have done, and for what I have become.
Available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kinkel/trial/#5.
81. See Frontline, supra note 52, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/kinkel/trial/judge.html.
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for Mr. Kinkel to know there was a price to be paid for each person hit by his
bullets.”82
The reader will no doubt have noticed in my account of the Kinkel
sentencing the sorts of public reactions to crime I mentioned earlier in this
article: intense hatred and dehumanization of Kinkel (“if a dog got rabid . . .
you destroy it”), abandonment of a commitment to moral behavior (“for you to
be tortured and troubled . . . is the final justice”); blindness to public benefit
from any disposition other than the maximum possible sentence (“[a]nything
less . . . would be a slap in the face on the victims”).83 These reactions could
have been diminished by a court that took seriously its role of reminding the
people about our Constitution’s commitment to human rights. The judge in the
Kinkel case should have done this. He should have pointed out to the victims
the humanity of the defendant and the defendant’s mental illness and suffering.
The Kinkel sentencing also displayed a profound misunderstanding about
the noncompensatory character of criminal justice, a misunderstanding
exacerbated when the judge caved in to victim demands that the sentence pay
each of them back for their wounds. The judge should have reinforced the
notion that criminal sentences serve public goals and not private ones. He also
should have discussed with the victims the benefits to them, and the public as a
whole, of a fair and impartial sentence, regardless of its length. He should
have addressed seriously the goal of rehabilitation.
I do not mean to suggest that the judge in the Kinkel case was illintentioned or malicious. Rather, he was unenlightened by example. He had
seen nothing in recent opinions by the justices of the United States Supreme
Court to serve as inspiration or to give him the courage to resist victims’ angry
demands. Although I have not spoken with him, I have spoken with other
Oregon trial judges about victim statements at sentencing. Those I have
spoken with have agreed that victim demands put unbearable pressure on
judges to enact harsher sentences than they would otherwise believe to be
appropriate. One judge acknowledged that it is wrong—and even illegal under
82. See id., available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kinkel/trial/
judge.html. The judge also based his sentence on a recent change to the Oregon Constitution,
which formerly stated: “Laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of
reformation, and not of vindictive justice.” OR. CONST., art. I, § 15 (1859). In 1996, Oregon
voters amended the constitution to read: “Laws for the punishment of crimes shall be founded on
these principles: the protection of society, personal responsibility, accountability for one’s
actions, and reformation.” Id. (1996). Finally, the judge compared the seriousness of Kinkel’s
conduct with that of other defendants he had sentenced. Frontline, supra note 52.
83. There were, as well, at least two violations of Kinkel’s free-standing due process rights,
although it is not my purpose here to argue doctrine. First, Kinkel’s due process rights were
violated when the judge permitted the victims to give their opinions about the appropriate
sentence, and second, due process was offended when the judge enacted sentence after hearing
the sentencing demands of a large angry crowd in his courtroom. The pressure on the judge
should leave us in doubt that the sentence was fair and impartial.
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Oregon law—to permit victims to make sentencing demands,84 but she said she
was helpless to stop it or to engage in the kind of teaching that I have urged in
this essay.
Of all judges, surely Supreme Court justices are best positioned to teach
the difficult lessons of due process, insulated as they are from the political
process and the raw emotions of the trial courtroom. The silence of these
privileged judicial officers suggests that we need to call them to their senses.

84. Victims in Oregon are permitted by statute to explain the impact of the crime and to give
their views about the defendant and those sentencing matters that relate to victim compensation—
i.e., restitution and a compensatory fine. See OR. REV. STAT. § 137.013 (1999). Oregon statutes
(including its capital sentencing statute) do not, however, give victims the right to speak about
other aspects of criminal sentencing. Id. See also § 163.150(1)(a). The Oregon Constitution
includes a provision granting victims “the right to be present at and, upon specific request, . . . to
be heard at . . . sentencing.” OR. CONST. art. I, § 42, cl. 1(a). There are no cases yet interpreting
the breadth of that right.

